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A Wigmorian Defense of Feminist Method
by
KATHARINE K. BAKER
I have been asked to comment on Aviva Orenstein's paper. This
is a particularly pleasant task because I agree with almost everything
she said. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is good. The recently en-
acted Federal Rule of Evidence 4132 is bad. Social science evidence
should be used to help eradicate the effects of cultural stereotypes
and the use of syndrome evidence is promising but dangerous.
I want to focus not on whether these conclusions are right, but
on how feminist method, most particularly narrative, necessarily
leads us to these conclusions. I will argue that Wigmore and the
original proponents of bans on character evidence understood pre-
cisely what the feminist use of narrative has tried to establish: good
stories have their own truth and working to understand the particu-
larities of that truth is the only fair way to adjudicate facts.
Every trial is its own story.' Bans on character evidence try to
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to
thank Michelle Oberman and all of the participants at this wonderful conference for their
insights and encouragement.
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 excludes evidence of a victim's past sexual behav-
ior or her sexual predisposition.
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 413 permits admission of evidence that the accused has
previously committed sexual assault.
3. See Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in
Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 663,706-15 (1998).
4. Feminists are not the only scholars to use narrative: see DERRICK BELL, AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (use of narrative to debate civil rights); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LiTERATURE (1990)
(using narrative in moral philosophy); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989). However, feminists have
used narrative extensively. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS (1991); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Re-
production" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Im-
ages of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991);
Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenonednological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L. J. 81 (1987). As Patricia Cain has written,
"[l]istening to women and believing their stories is central to feminist method." Patricia
A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERK. WOMEN'S L. J. 191,
195 (1989). Indeed, if one views consciousness-raising as a form of narrative then "the
major technique of analysis, structure of organization, method of practice, and theory of
social change of the women's movement" is narrative. See Catharine MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 519-20 (1982).
See also Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990).
5. The literary analogy for trials is not new. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword:
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ensure that the trial's story will be a good novel, with real characters.
not a Harlequin romance. Harlequin romances are boring and fake
and false at some level because the characters are not real; they are
unidimensional types. They are the rugged masculine man and the
feminine heroine and they are motivated by ubiquitous, unidimen-
sional emotions, like greed or passion. There is no complexity, no
nuance, no real life, no truth. Good trials, fair trials, and arguably the
very principles of due process incorporated in the notion of a hearing,
attempt to give the participants an opportunity to tell a real story
with real people in it, not an off-the-rack tale with stock characters.
The title of this conference is Truth and Its Rivals. In evaluating
the merits of truth, it is important to recognize that there are differ-
ent kinds of truths. Literary truth and scientific truth are different
concepts. Truth in the physical sciences tends to focus on the univer-
sal, absolute, and objective. Physical scientists find facts that are al-
ways true, given certain parameters. Social science focuses on accu-
rate models, ideal types that explain psychological, sociological, and
economic behavior in the aggregate. Social scientific models are true
if they reflect typical behavior accurately. Literary truth is different.
Literature suggests truth when the characters are real. Characters
are real when they are unique, full, unpredictable, unable to be en-
capsulated by the universal norms of either physical or social science,
and instead must be described to and experienced by the reader
through the author.
One does not know or understand a literary figure after the first
few pages of description. If one did, it would be a boring read. Char-
acter profiles can be accurate in the physical or social science sense,
but never in the literary sense. We know good literature because, in
the words of Kathryn Abrams, there is a "concreteness, particularity,
and internal consistency [to] the account,, 6 not because the account
can be documented as accurate by reference to external evidence.
Juries are supposed to evaluate facts as we evaluate literature.
They are supposed to determine truth based on the complexities of
the characters in front of them, not on a set of universal truths or
types that might be true on average. Character evidence is harmful
to this process because it types people just as the hard and social sci-
ences do and just as bad novels do. The feminist call to listen to nar-
rative is an attempt to force the law to tell stories that ring true in the
Telling Stories, 7 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2080 (1989) ("The resolution of any individual case
in the law relies heavily on a court's adoption of a particular story, one that makes sense.
is true to what the listeners know about the world, and hangs together.") See also W.
LANCE BENNETT AND MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM (1981): Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victims Story, 2 TEX. J. OF WOMEN
AND THE L. 277, 288-289 (1993).
6. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1023 (1991).
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literary sense.
Thus, a feminist analysis of the problem of character evidence is
not significantly different than the analysis that Wigmore or McCor-
mick might have given us, except that it expands the class of people
entitled to be judged free of character type. The problem with the
original rules is that they were not sensitive enough to the ways in
which typing, particularly typing of non-mainstream groups, is inevi-
table. Wigmore understood that prior act evidence might lead us to
type the defendant as a unidimensionally "bad" guy,7 but he did not
adequately understand, or perhaps was not sufficiently concerned
with, how jurors use the types and categories through which they
have come to understand the world to evaluate all of the parties in
front of them.
I should make clear here that the prejudice and error with which
I am concerned primarily is what Professor Park calls "inferential er-
ror":' inferring too much from one piece of prior act evidence. More
specifically, with typing, the problem is letting one piece of prior act
evidence, such as a past sexual encounter or prior commission of
rape, confirm a social stereotype and thereby magnify the potential
prejudicial damage. The main prejudice stems not from inferring too
much from the prior act itself, but from inferring too much from the
stereotype into which the prior act fits. When a rape victim says that,
after trial, she felt like her enemy was more the defense lawyer than
the defendant himself,9 she is recognizing that her enemy-the most
powerful obstacle to a successful prosecution-was the stereotype of
the "loose female" on which the defense counsel relied in telling the
story that got his client acquitted.0
We cannot get rid of types. Typing is inevitable because catego-
rizing and classifying is an epistemological necessity. It is how we
come to understand and make sense of the world. For the world of
physical sciences, as E.O. Wilson illustrates, taxonomic classification
7. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 at 1212
(Peter Tillers, rev. 1983). See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 at 345-47 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 218-19 (2d ed. 1983). As these scholars indicate, if
the jury views the defendant as generally "bad," it will readily assume that the defendant
did the alleged act.
8. See generally Roger C. Park, Character Evidence Issues in the O.J. Simpson
Case-Or, Rationales of the Character Evidence Ban, with Illustration from the Simpson
Case, 67 U. COL. L. REv. 747,767-70 (1996).
9. See AUDREY SAVAGE, TWICE RAPED 31 (1990). This book is an account of the
author's own rape and the subsequent trial.
10. For more on how different stereotypical stories affect rape prosecutions, see An-
drew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S.
CAL. REV. L. AND WOMEN'S STUD. 387 (1996)
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makes science possible." Typing is the essence of what social scien-
tists do. More universally, as Martha Minow succinctly explains,
"cognitively, we need simplifying categories... unifying catego-
ries... [to] ... help organize experience, even at the cost of denying
it."12 The law is particularly vulnerable to this means of giving struc-
ture. One cannot reach a legal result until one determines the cate-
gory or type of precedent that controls. "[C]ourts make decisions
using analogies and distinctions.., tying 'like things' together.""
Thus, typing is necessary for practicing law. But it is a dangerous way
to adjudicate facts.'
Typing is especially dangerous in situations in which we are try-
ing to evaluate experiences had by people who are clearly different
than ourselves." The more heterogeneous our society becomes, the
more jurors evaluate people different than themselves. Their natural
tendency is to assume that if person A is different from them in way
X, and person B is also different from them in way X, then person A
and person B are similar in many ways. The technical name for this
propensity is "the representative heuristic,' 6 but the best way of il-
lustrating both the ubiquity and potential harm of this propensity is
to tell a story involving my three year old niece.
We were at a playground. At that age, my niece had several Af-
rican-American women in her life, but only one African-American
man, a young man named Greg who worked in her daycare center.
While we were at the playground, a young African-American man
walked across the field and my niece yelled out after him, "Greg,
11. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 49 (1992).
12. Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 47.
53 (1988).
13. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 18 (1995). "Since [legal] classi-
fication involves line drawing and assessments of similarity and difference, it is mired in
stereotypes." Id. at 19.
14. As Professor Sheppele has argued previously, the fact determination process is
integrally related to the categorization process because courts usually determine the rele-
vant categories of precedent before determining which facts are relevant. See KIM LANE
SHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 97
(1988) ("The description of the facts of the case is constrained by the lawyer's view of the
available courses of legal action.").
15. Lynne Henderson has noted the difficulties in trying to empathize with people
who are different than ourselves. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1584 (1987). In order to empathize, one must transcend the stereo-
type or category through which one initially understands the subject and relates to the
subject as a real person in order to "(1) feel[] the emotion of another [and] (2) under-
stand[] the experience or situation of another.., often achieved by imagining oneself to
be in the position of the other." Id. at 1579.
16. See RICHARD NISBETI & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMING OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 24-25 (1980).
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Greg." The young man turned around, looked somewhat quizzical,
and then walked on, wondering, I presume, why this three-year-old
white kid was calling him Greg. What my niece was doing is what we
all do; she was typing. Her three-year-old mind was trying to effi-
ciently process the massive amount of new data that it was receiving
and so she assumed that African-American men and Greg were one
category. She didn't realize that there could be different African-
American men.
As our experience expands, we are less and less likely to do as
much typing as did my niece, but we are still dangerously prone to it.
Indeed, the problems of typing have emerged within the feminist
community itself in the debates about essentialism.' Typing is some-
thing that we all must fight. Attention to fairness and truth requires
that, as adults, we remind ourselves constantly not to rely on ques-
tionable typing categories. This takes work because really trying to
understand difference takes work. Again, think of a novel. A good
novelist has to work hard to make us understand a character who is a
different gender, different race, or different class than ourselves; a
novelist has to work hard to describe an aura, a climate, an atmos-
phere, and a culture very different than our own. Likewise, every lis-
tener has to work hard to understand the individuality and nuance in
stories about people who have lived lives different than the listener.
It is far easier to ignore nuance and individuality, efficaciously place
individuals in categories of other, and accept the generalized under-
standing" of what defines that other.
To bring this all back to evidence and rape, Rule 412 is necessary
and Rule 413 is dangerous precisely because of jurors' tendencies to
type those who are "other." Women who have previous sexual expe-
rience are other-they are women that defy the generalized under-
standing, or cultural script, of what a woman should be. We typify
them all and say, if she has slept around once, she is not like other
17. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (in the "tendency toward gender essentialism ... some voices are
silenced in order to privilege others. ... To be fully subversive, the methodology of femi-
nist legal theory should challenge not only law's content but its tendency to privilege the
abstract and unitary voice."); Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. L. FOR. 139,150 ("[Feminist and civil rights think-
ers ... have treated Black women in ways that deny both the unique compoundedness of
their situation and the centrality of their experiences to the larger classes of women and
Blacks.")
18. This generalized understanding is what others have called the "cultural script."
Coombs, supra note 5, at 278. It is what Professor Orenstein details in Part II.B of her
paper. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 677-82. Its prevalence is what Andrew Taslitz ex-
plores in Taslitz, supra note 10.
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women and therefore she probably said yes this time. 9
Comparably, African-American men are other, particularly in
the context of rape. Our culture has a deep and troubling history of
portraying African-American men as naturally disposed to rape. -
From the onset of Southern lynching campaigns,2' through the prose-
cutions of the Scottsboro Boys, 22 to the 1992 Presidential campaign,'
our cultural script has typed the African-American man as a rapist.
The African-American man on trial for rape confirms this stereotype
and the use of prior act evidence will only compound the problem.
Of course, Rule 413 allows in evidence of all prior incidents of
rape, not just those perpetrated by African-American men, but it is
highly likely that Rule 413 will be used disproportionately against Af-
rican-American men. 4 Moreover, the very notion of typing "rapists"
makes uniform an act that is far from uniform in its perpetration,
thereby blurring the nuance and complexity of the stories surround-
ing individual rapes. Should a man who committed date rape as an
19. To the extent that jurors take evidence of previous sexual activity or provocative
dress and use it to come to the conclusion that the woman is simply unworthy, the prob-
lem turns to one of nullification prejudice. See Park, supra note 8, at 770-71. ("Nullifica-
tion prejudice occurs where the trier draws factually accurate inferences from the eviden-
tiary facts, but uses them to make a decision on grounds not permitted by the substantive
law."). As I have argued elsewhere, many rape prosecutions are thwarted not because
the jurors disbelieve the woman, but because her defiance of the cultural script leaves the
jury completely unsympathetic to her harm and unwilling to enforce the laws of rape on
her behalf. See Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist?: Motivational Evidence and Rele-
vancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 589 (1997) ("If a woman breaches th[e
norms of appropriate sexual conduct], her credibility becomes largely irrelevant because
the jury will not bother to vindicate her violation.").
20. See Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 103.
114-16 (1983); ANGELA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 184-185 (1981); Erin
Edmonds, Mapping the Terrain of Our Resistance: A White Feminist Perspective on the
Enforcement of Rape Law, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 43, 44-5 (1992).
21. See IDA B. WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B.
WELLS 69-71 (Alreda M. Duster ed. 1970); DAVIS, supra note 20, at 172-201.
22. In 1931, nine black men were arrested and prosecuted for raping two white
women on a freight train in Alabama. Eight of the nine were sentenced to die. The white
women on whose testimony the prosecution relied were held in jail with threat of prosecu-
tion on prostitution and vagrancy grounds if they did not testify against the men. Two
years after the trial, one of the women recanted. All of the Scottsboro boys were eventu-
ally acquitted, but the last man did not go free until 1951. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 230-35 (1975).
23. One of the most effective advertisements used against presidential candidate Mi-
chael Dukakis employed the image and story of a black male rapist, Willie Horton, to
heighten voters' fear of violence and crime. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-
RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 11-12, 181-182 (1995).
24. See Baker, supra note 19, at 596 ("Because black men are disproportionately
involved with the criminal justice system and because police are going to be more likely to
arrest those people whom they know to have some history of sexual offense, the police
are going to be even more likely to arrest black men disproportionately.").
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18-year-old college student' be typed in the same category with a
man who beat, robbed, and raped a woman at knife point? Should
we encourage juries to think of some men as "rapists" when all the
evidence suggests that there is no accurate character profile of "a"
rapist?6 By doing so, the law endorses the use of stereotypes and is
complicit in allowing juries to ignore their duty to evaluate the
unique facts and complexities of the case in front of them. Rule 413
presents the legal equivalent to a novelist writing, "then she was
raped" and expecting the reader to understand what happened.'
Thus, Rule 412 and the denouncements of Rule 413 reflect feminist
concerns and feminist method because they combat stereotypes and
force the jury to listen to the actual stories of individuals.
Professor Orenstein's endorsement of social science evidence is
a further means of combating stereotype. She calls the use of experts
to dispel cultural stereotypes "group" character evidence,' but I
would call it "anti"-character evidence. The experts come in to help
purge the jurors of their tendency to think in character types. Al-
though presented by qualified social scientists, 9 this kind of evidence
can also be seen as a kind of "anti-expert" evidence. Rule 702, as
traditionally understood, allows expert testimony if the expert's ex-
pertise leads her to be able to infer more from the underlying facts
than can the jury.' In rape cases, we want this expert testimony, not
because the expert can infer more from the facts, but precisely be-
cause everyone should infer less from the facts. Again, the inferen-
tial error is in letting the prior facts amplify a pre-existing stereotype.
The goals for these experts is not so much to educate as to de-educate
the jurors, to help the jurors unlearn the ways in which they have
come to categorize the world.3' This does not mean that we defer to
25. Various studies indicate that approximately 25% of college males report having
engaged in coercive sex. See Karen R. Rapaport & C. Dale Pusey, Sexually Coercive
College Males, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 217,219-20 (1991).
26. See Baker, supra note 19, at 597-612.
27. Literature is notably bereft of rape scenes, possibly because authors simply do
not know how to describe it in a manner that will ring true. For one particularly compel-
ling description of rape, see GLORIA NAYLOR, THE WOMEN OF BREWSTER PLACE 170-
71 (1982).
28. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 707.
29. The experts must be qualified to interpret the data that they present. See FED.
R. EVID. 702.
30. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 7, at 859 (Experts "are able to aid the
jury in its task of fact-finding, not because they have fortuitously observed events which
are relevant to the jury's inquiry, but because they have specialized skill or training which
enables them to perceive and interpret events in ways that ordinary lay people cannot.").
31. Experiments analyzed by Nesbitt and Ross suggest that the success of "de-
educating" jurors in this way depends on experts providing jurors with the theoretical rea-
sons for why people come to believe what they believe. See NESBITr & ROSS, supra note
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the experts. 2 There is nothing to defer to them on because these ex-
perts should have nothing to say about the underlying facts. It is the
jury's job to evaluate the facts.
I am significantly more wary than is Professor Orenstein about
the use of syndrome evidence, however.33 Although some prosecu-
tors have used rape trauma syndrome evidence to help refute a de-
fendant's claim that the victim's behavior was inconsistent with that
of a rape victim,34 and several commentators have endorsed the use of
rape trauma syndrome evidence for this purpose,35 using syndrome
evidence in this manner runs the risk of replicating rather than eradi-
cating the problems with stereotypes. Feminists have already taken
and often regretted having taken this risk with Battered Women
Syndrome evidence. As others have analyzed, the class of women
abused by domestic violence is diverse and victim response to that
abuse is varied.36 In general, women may not respond to physical
abuse by a partner in the way in which the cultural script would ex-
pect them to restond, but neither do they necessarily respond in any
uniform manner.
16, at 191. Thus, courts should be careful to make sure that social science testimony used
for the purpose of debunking stereotypes of rapists and rape victims includes analysis of
how and why juries come to believe the cultural scripts on rape.
32. Ronald Allen and Joseph Miller have argued that the "deep[] question lurking in
the shadows" of contemporary debates about expert testimony "is whether fact finders
are to be educated by or to defer to experts." Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The
Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1131, 1131
(1993). Like those authors, I would argue, and the use of social science evidence in the
manner suggested argues, that expert testimony should be used as an educative tool, not a
grounds for deference.
33. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 41-44. Orenstein's endorsement of psychological
syndrome evidence in this manner parallels Professor Taslitz's call to use expert psycho-
logical evidence to explain defendants' state of mind in criminal trials. See Andrew Tas-
litz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character Evidence, 52
MD. L. REV. 1 (1993).
34. See State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165, 167 (Wis. 1988).
35. See Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape
Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69
MINN. L. REV. 395, 447-52 (1985); see generally David McCord, The Admissibility of Ex-
pert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome In Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L. REV.
1143 (1985).
36. See Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to Sup-
port the Substance, 38 How. L. J. 297, 302 (1995) ( arguing that African-American women
must overcome cultural stereotypes of themselves before they can even use the stereo-
types built into the Battered Women Syndrome); Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture:
Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV. W. L. J. 57, 92-93 (1994) (arguing
that Asian women will not necessarily meet the model). See also Martha R. Mahoney.
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1,
38-43 (1991) (arguing that the helpless image of Battered Women Syndrome may con-
tribute to stereotyping).
37. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconcep-
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Syndrome evidence backfires because it allows the jurors to sub-
stitute one stereotype for another: the image with which they came
into the trial is replaced with a new image, that of "the" battered
women or "the" rape survivor. Syndrome evidence allows the jury to
avoid confronting the particularities of the stories in front of them.
Thus, when a victim fails to conform to the syndrome script, the jury
dismisses her as readily as it would dismiss victims who did not con-
form to the cultural script. This result is understandable, for it is
much easier to replace one oversimplification with another than it is
to forsake one's original understanding," and painstakingly, story by
story, incorporate the particularity and uniqueness of the world
around you.
Trials should be concerned about truth, but they should be con-
cerned as much with literary truth as with probabilistic or scientific
proof. Good novels teach us that the world is not as universal or
typed a place as the sciences would have us believe. These novels
take work to write and work to read because they force us to under-
stand the complexity of truth. Attorneys and jurors should be forced
to do comparable work in understanding the complexity of truth.
Ridding the trial of character types helps forge a more complete
truth.
tions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397 (1991) (reporting that
among cases in which previously battered defendants asserted self-defense, 75% involved
confrontations, 4% were contract killings, 8% were sleeping-man cases, and 8% involved
defendant as initial aggressor during a lull in violence). See also David L Faigman and
Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIz. L. REv.
67, 112 (1997) (arguing that "[b]ecause... 'learned helplessness' theory places so much
emphasis upon the woman's inability to rescue herself from the abusive situation, any
proactive measures on the woman's part may thrust her outside of the protective realm of
the syndrome theory"). See also CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE,
BATrERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 179-81 (1989).
38. If narrative feminist methodology is radical it is radical because it attacks pre-
existing epistemological paradigms by requiring listeners to discard what they had come
to know as truth and construct new truths based on the stories in front in them.
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